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Abstract 
This paper examines competing notions of ‘masculinities’ in relation to crime, and the 
global nature of gendered inequalities.  It is the contention here that social constructionist 
theories of male sexualities contain certain theoretical deficits.  It is suggested that a post-
Postmodern analysis of ‘masculinities’ might incorporate some of the insights from Owen’s 
Genetic-Social meta-theoretical framework. Owen’s ‘sensitising’ framework has been 
‘applied’ to the sociological study of human biotechnology, ageing, ‘trust’ and professional 
power and crime in recent times.  Owen’s notion of the biological variable, in particular, 
might be incorporated into an analysis of ‘masculinities’ in relation to violence and crime.  
Additionally, it is recommended that these notions are combined with Layder’s concept of 
Psychobiography in order to theorise ‘masculinities’ and crime in the post-Genome age.    
 
 
 
Introduction 
The notion of ‘masculinity’ is both an essentially contested concept and praxis of everyday human 
existence and social relations yet its understanding is complex. Connell (2000), a major protagonist of 
masculinity studies, claims that in the past several years there has been an increase of concern with 
issues about men- a ‘Men’s Studies’ movement has gained momentum in which Connell’s (2000) 
work is bound up. Indeed, men in general remain the principle holders of economic and political 
power. Men make up a large majority of corporate executives, top professionals and holders of 
political representation and mandate. Globally, men held 93% of cabinet-level posts in 1996 and most 
top positions in international agencies (Powell, 2006). 
In Western culture in particular, men continue to control most technology such as the Internet 
(consider the major corporate ‘owners’ of Microsoft and Netscape-the two owners are men with a 
combined personal wealth of £97 billion-an amount which outstrips the combined GNP of most non-
Western nation-states) and weaponry (Powell, 2006). With only very limited exceptions it is men who 
staff and control the agencies of military force and judicial systems such as armies, intelligence 
agencies, police, prison and court systems (Connell, 2000). 
There is also a clear connection between men and violence. In the USA, for example, men are 
90% of those charged with aggravated assault, murder and manslaughter (Stanko, 2000). Men are 
much more likely than women to bear weapons: in the US, researchers have found rates of gun 
ownership among men running four times the rate for women, even after a campaign by the arms 
manufacturers to get women to buy guns (Connell, 2000). In the USA, UK and Europe, though both 
men and women can be involved in domestic violence, men are far more likely than women to be the 
perpetrators of serious injury against their partners (Stanko, 2000).   
In what follows we examine competing theories of ‘masculinities’ in relation to violence and 
crime, and the global nature of gendered inequalities. Drawing upon the work of authors such as 
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Connell (2000), Messerschmidt (1993), Collier (1998), MacInnes (1998), Powell (2006) and Jefferson 
(2007) who work within the sociological and criminological traditions, we consider the evidence for 
the social construction  of ‘masculinities’ (Connell, 2000), and male violence etc. it is the contention 
here that social constructionist theories such as those associated with Connell are interesting and 
useful in relation to the theoretical analysis of ‘masculinities’ as gender and gendered identities. 
However, they contain theoretical deficits and shortcomings in relation to the analysis of male 
sexualities. Here it is suggested that a post-Postmodern analysis of ‘masculinities’ might incorporate 
some of the insights from Owen’s (2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b; 2009a; 2009b; 2012) Genetic-Social 
metatheoretical framework. Owen’s ‘sensitising’ framework has been ‘applied’ to the sociological 
study of human biotechnologies, ageing, ‘trust’ and professional power and Garland’s (2001) ‘Culture 
of Crime Control’ thesis in recent times. Here it is suggested that Owen’s emphasis upon the 
biological variable (the evidence for genetic, or partially genetic, causality in relation to some human 
behaviour) in particular might be incorporated into an analysis of ‘masculinities’ and male sexuality 
in relation to violence and crime. Evidence from behavioural genetics and Evolutionary Psychology 
(Pinker, 1994; Ridley, 1999, 2003; Hamer and Copeland, 1999; and Cosmides and Tooby, 1997) is 
presented to counter the oversocialised (Owen, 2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b; 2009a; 2009b; 2012) 
idea that sexuality, and in this case male sexuality, is merely a socio-cultural creation and the 
production of a particular set of historical circumstances and obtains only within the terms of a 
discourse developed since the  seventeenth century (Foucault, 1980; Gagnon and Simon, 1973). In 
addition, it is recommended here that an analysis of ‘masculinities’, violence and crime might 
incorporate Layder’s (1997) notion of Psychobiography; the unique, asocial aspects of the person 
such as disposition etc. It is argued that there are clear theoretical links between the approaches of 
Owen and Layder, and that an analytical framework such as Owen’s Genetic-Social ‘sensitising 
device’ which advocates a flexible ontology, relies upon multifactorial analysis rather than unitary, 
reductionist, essentialist, and reified accounts, is better equipped to point a possible ‘way forward’ 
beyond pure social constructionism and anti-foundational Postmodern relativism. An approach such 
as Owen’s which side steps the nature/nurture divide, avoids the reductionism of hardline 
Sociobiology, and emphasises the mutuality between genes and environment, is arguably better placed 
to conceptualise the connections between ‘masculinities’, violence and crime in the post-Genome era. 
 
 
‘Masculinities’, Violence and Crime 
 
There appears to be evidence that men are more likely than women to be the targets of certain kinds of 
violence. They are more likely to be casualties in combat such as war. They are more likely to be the 
victims of assault in public violence such as ‘brawls’ and ‘fights’, and victims of what might be called 
‘business violence’ such as the intimidation and murder associated with the illicit drug trade 
especially in USA (Connell, 2000). There is also evidence that men are more likely to be arrested or 
imprisoned. Additionally, men as a taxonomic collectivity gain real and large advantages from the 
current system of gender relations; the scale of this dividend is indicated by the fact that men’s earned 
incomes, world-wide, are about 180% of women’s (Connell, 2000).   
Such power, control and male involvement in the complex web of major systems of 
domination are often thought to be “natural”, either prescribed by God or a consequence of biology 
(Connell, 2000)-the insights of science were vocal in articulating ‘truths’ about gendered behaviour 
concerned with shaping ‘who gets what, when and how’ in contemporary society. Indeed, essentialist 
views of gender are still popular and are consistently reinforced in the media on a daily basis. 
However, they are increasingly under challenge: the rise and consolidation of the ‘women’s liberation 
movement’ and the many feminisms that have manifested from it have produced a disturbance in the 
popular imagination concerning ideas about gender and behaviour. Such acceleration and impetus of 
sociological work has focused on the social construction of masculinity. 
The idea that masculinities are socially constructed goes back to early psychoanalysis, and in 
social science research first took the shape of a social-psychological concept, the ‘male sex role’. 
Such an approach emphasised the learning of norms for conduct and has been popular in social areas 
of concern such as educational studies (Connell, 2000). However, sex role theory is inadequate for 
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understanding the power and economic dimensions in gender. Further: ‘it is telling that discussions of 
‘the male sex role’ have mostly ignored gay men and have little to say about race and ethnicity. Sex 
role theory has a’ fundamental difficulty in grasping issues of power’ (Connell, 2000:27). 
Connell points to an explosion in masculinity studies which focus on: marital sexuality, 
‘homophobic’ murders, body building culture, insurance industry, public and private violence, 
professional sports, criminal justice and the literary genre. Connell (ibid) calls such an array of 
research an ‘ethnographic moment’ in which the local and specific are emphasised.  As Jefferson 
(2007:246) has recently suggested, within criminology, scholars such as Messerschmidt (1993) have 
utilized Connell’s (ibid) concept of a, ‘tripartite structure of gender relations and hegemonic and 
subordinated masculinities, as well as the importance of practice’, and applied them to contemporary 
theorising about crime and criminal behaviour. Messerschmidt conceptualises all structures (class, 
race etc) as being, ‘implicated simultaneously in any given practice, and practices are situationally 
constrained by the need to ‘account’ for our actions to normative conceptions (of appropriate 
gender/race/class conduct)’ (Jefferson, 2007). Within such a theoretical framework, crime may be 
conceptualised as a ‘resource’ for specific men in specific social settings for the ‘accomplishment’ of 
masculinity. The significance and importance of crime as a ‘resource’ for certain men depends upon 
other ‘resources’ at their disposal, and these in turn, are a ‘product’ of, their position in class, gender 
and race relations and the sorts of situations they find themselves in’ (Jefferson, 2007: 246). As 
Jefferson makes clear, critics of Messerschmidt’s attempts to offer explanations for ‘the ‘doing’ of all 
kinds of crime, from varieties of work-based crime to diverse forms of street crime’ as different ways 
of ‘doing’ masculinity, have begun to question whether the author’s key ideas are in effect unitary, 
reductionist explanations. 
Some scholars such as MacInnes (1998) view masculinity as an ‘ideology’ which has 
developed to enable people to understand continuities of sexual and gender inequalities in what 
Jefferson terms, ‘an age of formal equality’. Collier (1998) has sought to develop a relational account 
of masculinities which acknowledges the ‘sexed’ body (in common with writers of the ‘embodied’ 
school) without ‘reverting to a biological essentialism’ (Jefferson, 2007:247). Arguably, as Owen 
(2009a) demonstrates, it is quite possible to ‘bring in biology’ in theoretical analysis without resorting 
to ‘essentialism’. Essentialism, as employed as a ‘cardinal sin’ to avoid in theorising by both Sibeon 
(2004) and Owen (2009a), refers to a form of theoretical reasoning that in an aprioristic fashion 
presupposes a kind of unity of homogeneity of phenomena, such as ‘white men’ or ‘working class 
women’ etc.  Owen utilises the meta-concept of the biological variable in a non-essentialist fashion, 
and we should regard the term as referring to the evidence for an, at least in part, biological basis for 
some human behaviour. The evidence for the biological variable comes directly from the literature of 
evolutionary psychology and behavioural genetics such as the work of Ridley (1999, 2003), Dunbar 
(1996), Hamer and Copeland (1999) and others.The evidence for  genetic/partially genetic causality in 
relation to selected behaviours such as sexuality (Hamer and Copeland, 1999; Owen, 2006a; Bogaert 
and Fisher, 1995)  language (Hamer and Copeland, 1999; Dunbar, ibid; Enard et al, 2002;  Pinker, 
1994) reactions to stress (Ridley, 2003; Pollock, 1988) are discussed in some depth in Owen’s (2009) 
Social Theory and Human Biotechnology, and the meta-concept of the biological variable is 
incorporated into his Genetic-social sensitizing device/meta-theoretical framework. It is the 
contention here that this meta-concept is of great value and should be incorporated into the theoretical 
analysis of ‘masculinities’. 
The modern term of ‘masculinity’ assumes that a person’s or group’s behaviour is a result of 
the type of person/group they are. It presupposes a belief in individual difference and personal agency. 
It builds upon the concept of individuality developed in early-modern Europe with colonialism and 
capitalism (Connell, 2000). It exists in contrast to ‘femininity’. This idea that men and women are 
qualitatively different did not exist until the 18
th
 century and the so-called ‘bourgeois’ ideology of 
separate spheres. 
The rise of the Enlightenment saw the consolidation of embedded images of ‘white 
masculinity’. It was at this point that notions of reason, science, progress and masculinity were 
merged into a unified concept of ‘manhood’. Reason and objectivity also provided the moral 
legitimacy for the rise of capitalism and the modern organisation of society. For philosophers such as 
Kant, reason tempered by science could overcome feelings and intuition. At the time of the 
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Enlightenment, utilitarian doctrines were gaining momentum enshrined by the idea that ‘success is 
happiness’. As industrial capitalism and the world of machines grew and flourished, this rationality 
included competition, planning, and goal attainment. 
Further, Powell (2006) makes the point that men also learned to see themselves as extensions 
of the industrial world around them. They learned to see themselves in both body and mind as 
machines, which included rigorous discipline, precision, and self-control.  For some men, the fear of 
losing control also applies to sexuality such that emotional responses to sexual experience are seen as 
signs of weakness. Sexual expression becomes performance, with outcomes to be ranked and rated. 
Sexuality itself is related and shaped to what Connell (2000) refers to as ‘social structure’.  From this, 
Connell (2000) argues that the structures of power in our society create different forms of masculinity 
for different groups of men. The dominant masculinity Connell refers to as ‘hegemonic masculinity’, 
which includes the expectations of ‘manhood’ held by white upper-middle and upper class men 
(‘Hegemony derives from Gramsci which translates as, ‘dominant ideology’). Below hegemonic 
masculinity are several forms of subordinate masculinities. These include white working-class men 
and men from ethnic minority backgrounds. Subordinate groups of men carry out the work of 
dominant men (e.g., physical labour, subordination of women, upholding masculine imagery), but 
they do not reap the benefits of social dominance and political-economic control. 
 Several aspects characterise ‘masculinity’: firstly essentialist definitions pick a feature that 
defines masculinity (risk-taking, aggression, responsibility, irresponsibility, and more) and describe 
men’s lives according to it.; secondly, positivist definitions define masculinity as that which men 
actually are in terms of psychology, biology and physiology; thirdly, normative definitions offer a 
standard for what men ‘ought to be like’ (aspirational standards), but the problem with this is that we 
cannot define masculinity according to a standard that only a minute, if any, number of me actually 
meet; fourthly, semiotic approaches define masculinity through a system of symbolic difference 
between masculinity and femininity. Masculinity is defined as that which is not feminine. This 
definition uses masculinity as the master signifier, the place of symbolic authority, with femininity 
defined by ‘lack’. This definition has been very effective in cultural analysis. 
Connell’s argument is that rather than attempting to define masculinity, we should be 
focusing on ‘the process and relationships through which men and women conduct gendered lives’ 
(2000:78).  Indeed, according to Connell, when we refer to masculinity and femininity, we are talking 
about configurations of gender practice. Masculinity and femininity are gender projects which are 
‘processes of configuring practice through time, which transform their starting-points in gender 
structures’ (Connell, 2000:72). Connell claims these three projects can be used to study culture and 
society: 
 
1) Individual life-course, personality or character 
2) Discourse, ideology or culture 
3) Institutions such as the state, schools or workplace. 
 
To consolidate this, Connell describes a three-fold model of the structure of gender: 
 
a) Power relations: in Western society, the subordination of women and the domination of men, 
often referred to as patriarchy. It persists despite resistance. 
b) Production relations: the gender division of labour and its consequences, the benefit that men 
gain from unequal shares of the product, and the gender character of capital. 
c) Cathexis: the gendered character of sexual desire and the practices that shape that desire 
which are aspects of the gendered order. For example, the relationship between 
heterosexuality and men’s position of dominance. 
 
Connell (2000) notes that gender, as a way of structuring social practice, is unavoidably connected to 
other social structures; ‘race’ and class for example. Gender, it is argued, intersects with ‘race’ and 
class. For example, white men’s masculinities are constructed in relation to black men as well as in 
relation to white women. White masculinity is viewed by Connell as being fused with institutional 
power. For Connell working class masculinities depend on class as much as they do gender relations. 
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The argument behind this is that to understand gender we must constantly go ‘beyond’ it. We must 
not only recognise multiple masculinities but we must also investigate the gender relations between 
them-historically, inter-personally, locally, and globally in order to explain the manifestation of 
dominant ideas which centre on ‘masculinity’. 
 
 
A Genetic-Social Approach to ‘Masculinities’ 
 
Although such perspectives may well be useful in conceptualising ‘masculinity’ as a form of gender 
identity and social construct, but they concern shortcomings in relation to the conceptualisation of 
male sexuality. As Ridley (1999) has suggested, after over twenty five years of research into 
behavioural genetics it is impossible to deny that genes do influence behaviour, and it is the 
contention here that this applies to male sexualities. However, environmental influences are equally 
important too, if not more so. We need to recognise the mutuality between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ and 
avoid reductionist and essentialist forms of theoretical reasoning.  Owen (2006a, 2006b) cautions 
against the use of two illicit form of reasoning in  theoretical analysis, which he terms, ‘the 
oversocialised gaze’ and ‘genetic fatalism’. Genetic fatalism’ is the equation of biological 
determinism with inevitability, and the ‘oversocialised gaze’ refers to strongly ‘environmentalist’ 
accounts which seek to deny biological variables in causality (instincts etc) altogether. Owen’s 
(2006a; 2006b; 2007a;2007b) recent work is a contribution towards theoretical development as part of 
the ‘return to’ sociological theory and method associated with Sibeon (2004), Layder (1997, 1998), 
Mouzelis (1991, 1995) and Archer (1995), in tandem with a cautious attempt to ‘build bridges’ 
between sociological metatheory and insights from Evolutionary Psychology and behavioural 
genetics. Owen argues for a ‘way forward’ beyond, on the one hand, the relativism and nihilism of the 
Postmodern ‘cultural turn’, and on the other, illegitimate theoretical constructs such as the previously 
mentioned oversocialised conceptions of the person and genetic fatalism. Here it is suggested that 
some insights from Owen’s Genetic-Social ‘sensitising’ framework might be usefully employed in 
attempts to theorise masculinities, violence and crime. In After Postmodernism: Towards an 
Evolutionary Sociology, Owen (2007a) suggests that a modification of Sibeon’s (2004) original anti-
reductionist framework to include focusing upon the biological variable (evidence from Evolutionary 
Psychology and behavioural genetics for an, at least in part, genetic basis for some human behaviour) 
has an explanatory potential which is best expressed in terms of large-scale synthesis. Owen (ibid) 
considers the evidence that genes play a  role alongside environment in terms of causality in relation 
to human behaviour, drawing upon the work of Ridley (1999, 2003), Hamer and Copeland (1999), 
Pinker (1994) and Cosmides and Tooby (1997). He is of the view that there is sufficient evidence to 
warrant the incorporation of a focus upon the biological variable  into his new, metatheoretical 
framework alongside the meta-concepts of agency-structure, micro-macro, time-space and modified 
notions of Foucauldian  power employed in Sibeon’s original framework. The latter notion of 
‘modified’ Foucauldian power entails a recognition of the dialectical relationship between agentic 
and systemic forms of power; the relational, contingent and emergent dimensions of power; and the 
concept that contra Foucault power can be ‘stored’ in roles and social systems/relations. Owen 
considers it very important to keep in mind Ridley’s (ibid) notion of nature via nurture when focusing 
upon biological variables in analysis, the ‘feedback loop’ which embraces genes and environment 
acknowledging plasticity and mutuality. Drawing upon Evolutionary Psychology and behavioural 
genetics, the framework posits that ‘nurture’ depends upon genes, and genes require ‘nurture’. Genes 
predetermine the broad structure of the brain of Homo Sapiens, but they also absorb formative 
experiences, react to social ‘cues’ or, as Ridley (1993:53) suggests, ‘need to be switched on, and 
external events-or free-willed behaviour-can switch on genes’.  
Owen’s Genetic-Social framework in its current stage of development, arises out of a critique 
of the following illegitimate forms of theoretical reasoning: reductionism; essentialism; reification; 
functional teleology; relativism; duality of structure; genetic fatalism and the oversocialised gaze.  
Arguably, the framework’s usefulness lies in its avoidance of anti-foundational, 
Postmodern/Poststructuralist relativism; harshly ‘environmentalist’ oversocialised  accounts of the 
person which deny genetic or even partially-genetic explanations altogether (such as those of Gagnon 
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and Simon, 1973); the common tendency in social science towards genetic fatalism; and its adoption 
of the Post-Postmodern sociological ‘realism’ of those such as Sibeon (2004), Layder (1997,1998), 
Mouzelis (1991,1995) and Archer (1995). It is contended here that Owen’s Genetic-Social approach, 
and in particular the emphasis upon acknowledging the biological variable in analysis, is a useful 
theoretical ‘toolkit’ with which to conceptualise masculinities in the context of violence and crime, 
and in particular male sexuality. The framework is an example of meta-theory, entailing 
methodological generalisations as opposed to substantive generalisations, and the intention is to 
‘prepare the ground’ for further empirical investigation. 
Surprisingly, in the post-Human Genome Project landscape and rapid advances in the field of 
genetics, many such oversocialised  accounts may be found within social science. For example, as 
Owen (2006a: 907) shows, ‘Giddens (1993:57) suggests that, ‘human beings have no instincts in the 
sense of complex patterns of unlearned behaviour’’. Owen (2006b:190) also identifies Foucault’s 
(1980) suggestion that sexuality is purely a socio-cultural creation, ‘that sexuality as we know it is the 
production of a particular set of historical circumstances and obtains only within the terms of a 
discourse developed since the seventeenth century’ as another example of the oversocialised gaze. 
Owen (2006b:190) has argued that Foucault’s position is very similar to that of the symbolic 
interactionist writers, Gagnon and Simon (1973). The latter authors adopted a ‘radical form of social 
construction theory which is extremely oversocialised’, in arguing that there is no ‘‘natural’ drive in 
human biological make-up’ (Owen, 2006b: 190). Sexual drive must, under their terms, be regarded as 
a cultural and historical construction. As far as Gagnon and Simon (1973) are concerned, not only do 
we ‘learn’ what ‘sex’ means, and what is sexually arousing to us, but we also ‘learn’ to want sex. The 
authors acknowledge that the human body has a repertoire of ‘gratifications’ (including the capacity 
to experience an orgasm), but this does not mean that we automatically, instinctively want to engage 
in them. Certain ‘gratifications’ will be selected as ‘sexual’ through the learning of ‘sexual scripts’. 
From Gagnon and Simon’s perspective, socialisation is not concerned with controlling innate sexual 
desire so that it is expressed in ‘civilised’, acceptable ways, but rather with the ‘learning’ of these 
complicated ‘scripts’ which serve to specify circumstances which elicit sexual desire. From this 
standpoint, similar as it is to Foucauldian conceptualisations of sexuality, ‘sexual drive’ is a learnt 
social goal. 
Contradictory evidence, as Owen (2006b: 190) suggests, can be found in the work of Hamer 
and Copeland (1999:163) who have cogently shown how genes influence our sexual desire, how often 
we have sex etc and, ‘help make us receptive to the social interactions and signs of mutual affection 
that we feel instinctively and now call ‘love’’. Importantly, the authors, alongside providing evidence 
for ‘emotional’ and sexual instincts, also provide evidence that genes are not fixed instructions, but 
rather ‘take their cue from nature/the environment’ (Owen, 2006b: 190). Hamer and Copeland 
(1999:179) investigated whether there was a ’correlation between the D4DR gene and number of 
sexual partners’ in male subjects. They had previously established that ‘novelty seeking’ and sexual 
behaviour are linked, and that ‘novelty-seeking’ is in part mediated by the D4 dopamine receptor 
gene. The authors found that there was indeed a link between D4DR genes and the number of sexual 
partners in men. Looking first at heterosexual men, Dean Hamer found that the men with, ‘the long 
form of the D4DR gene, the high novelty-seekers’, had slightly more female partners than those with 
the short form, ‘the low novelty-seekers’ (1999: 179). It should be emphasised that the trait referred to 
here as, ‘novelty-seeking’ means, ‘finding pleasure in new, varied and intense experiences’ (Hamer 
and Copeland, 1999:178).  
It was the study by Bogaert and Fisher (1995) at the University of Western Ontario which 
probably did more than any other towards establishing the idea that a novelty-seeking score was a 
better predictor of the number of sexual partners than the other variables such as masculine age, 
physical attractiveness etc. ‘The more a person was a thrill seeker, the more partners he had’ (Hamer 
and Copeland, 1999:178). Hamer and Copeland’s study became rather interesting when they asked 
how many other men had the respondents slept with. Despite the heterosexual orientation of the 
respondents, ‘some had slept with another man, usually just once and when they were young’ (Hamer 
and Copeland, 1999: 179). Here was a strong correlation to the D4DR gene. ‘Straight’ men with the 
long form of the gene, the high novelty-seekers, ‘were six times more likely to have slept with another 
man than those with a short gene’, and , ‘about half of the long gene subjects had ever had a male 
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sexual partner’, compared with only eight per cent of the short gene males (Hamer and 
Copeland,1999:179). The reverse was true for ‘gay’ men. As Hamer and Copeland expected, the 
homosexual respondents, ‘had more male partners than the straight men did female partners’, and ‘the 
D4DR gene had the expected effect’ (1999: 180). However, the effect of the gene was much stronger 
for the number of female partners of the gay men. Those with the long, high novelty-seeking form of 
the D4DR gene had sexual intercourse ‘with more than five times as many women’ as did those with 
the short, low novelty-seeking form (1999:180). Although, as the authors acknowledge, the gay men 
may have had sexual relations with women in part because of social pressure, and it ‘seemed that a 
desire for new experiences also played a role’ (1999: 180). According to Hamer and Copeland 
 
These results show that the D4DR dopamine receptor gene does influence male sexual 
behaviour, but indirectly. For a straight man, sleeping with another man is about as novel as 
you get. For a gay man, having sex with a woman is equally unique. Does this mean that 
D4DR is a ‘promiscuity gene’ and that an errant husband can tell his wife, ‘’I couldn’t help it, 
it was genetic?’’ Of course not. A gene doesn’t make a person commit adultery. It simply 
determines the way certain brain cells respond to dopamine, which, in turn influence a person’s 
reaction to novel stimuli. How a person reacts to that stimuli is more a matter of character than 
of temperament. (1999:180) 
 
Arguably, Hamer and Copeland provide convincing evidence here that it is a mistake to engage in 
genetic fatalism; predisposition need not imply inevitability. Additionally, it is a mistake to deny 
altogether the influence of genetic variables in relation to causality, in the form of oversocialised 
accounts of the person in the fashion of Gagnon and Simon (1973) and Foucault (1980). As Owen 
(2006a, 2006b) has suggested, it is very important to recognise and acknowledge the elegant 
mutuality between genes and environment, to understand that genes ‘take their cue’ from nature and 
can be ‘switched on’ by environmental and agentic stimuli. In other words, we need to reject the 
‘nature versus nurture’ paradigm in favour of what Ridley (1999, 2003) calls, ‘nature via nurture’. 
 
 
Psychobiography 
 
It is the contention here that there are close theoretical links between Owen’s (2006a, 2006b) concept 
of the biological variable and Derek Layder’s (1997) cogent, useful concept of Psychobiography; the 
largely unique, asocial components of an actor’s disposition, behaviour and self-identity. These 
aspects are regarded by Layder as relatively independent of face-to-face interaction and the macro-
social. For Layder, human beings are composed of unique elements of cognition, emotion and 
behaviour that are, in some sense, separable from the social world, while at the same time related in 
various ways to social conditions and social experiences. Arguably, it would prove useful to 
incorporate notions of unique, asocial Psychobiography into the analysis of masculinities, and in 
particular male sexuality, in relation to violence and crime. As Layder suggests, asocial elements are 
separable from but yet linked to the social world. This form of reasoning appears to have much in 
common with the Genetic-Social approaches of Owen in the sense that it acknowledges the mutuality 
of the social and asocial. Derek Layder, like Roger Sibeon, Tim Owen, Nicos Mouzelis and Margaret 
Archer, appears to be advocating to some extent a ‘Post-Postmodern’ renewal of sociological theory 
and method, favouring a flexible ontology which avoids both the ‘absolutist’ knowledge-claims of 
meta-narratives and the reductionism and essentialism of modernist paradigms. Layder appears to 
favour a cogent, ‘modest’ approach to social explanation, which retains a distinct epistemological 
commitment to realism, recognising that society is multiform, relatively indeterminate and difficult to 
predict. This metatheoretical approach is similar to Sibeon’s (2004) original framework, in that it 
avoids unitary, reductionist explanations and opposes the idea of duality of structure, indeed any 
attempt to collapse distinctions between agency and structure, micro-macro etc. 
Recently, Owen (2007b:9) has drawn upon Layder’s notion of Psychobiography in relation to 
David Garland’s (2001) ‘Culture of Control’ thesis, and in particular, ‘Garland’s rather under-
theorised concept of ‘the individual’’. Here, Owen suggests that Garland’s implied call for a 
recognition of criminals as ‘individuals’ would be, ‘strengthened by a recognition of the individual-
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subjective referred to by Layder as Psychobiography, and the intersubjective, which is labelled 
Situated Activity’. Arguably, these insights should be incorporated into the analysis of masculinities in 
relation to violence and crime in order to avoid reductionist, oversocialised concepts of male identity 
and male sexuality. In the foreword to Owen’s Social Theory and Human Biotechnology (2009a) 
Layder himself writes  
 
Owen wants to emphasise the importance of the ‘biological variable’ in social analysis and 
draws on evidence from evolutionary biology and behavioural science to suggest an at least 
in part, genetic basis for some behaviour. It is clear that Owen wants to avoid the sterile 
‘nature versus nurture’ confrontation and to replace it with the more subtle and productive 
view that ‘nature’ operates ‘via nurture’. Support for this he finds in the work of Ridley, 
which stresses the mutuality and plasticity of the causal relations between genes and 
environment. In particular Owen agrees with Ridley’s view that genes can be ‘switched on’ 
by external environmental events, or ‘free-willed behaviour’. Here, Owen points out a 
connection with my own notion of ‘psychobiography’. By this concept I originally intended 
to emphasise the relatively autonomous and unique psychological aspects of individuals’ 
predispositions and behaviour that interact with social influences to produce emergent 
effects. However, I fully concur with Owen’s ‘extension’ of the implications of the notion of 
psychobiography to embrace the mutuality and plasticity of the relations between genetic and 
environmental influences. (2009a: xiv) 
 
Gender Relations, Masculinities and Violence 
Structures of gender relations change over time, sometimes in response to external sources, and 
sometimes from internal sources. With the so-called ‘Women’s Movement’ in the UK, the conflict of 
interests embedded in gender relations became obvious. The unequal structure placed men as a 
taxonomic collectivity in a defensive position and women in an offensive position, seeking change. 
Such a ‘battle’ is hard to imagine without violence, and it is generally the dominant gender that has 
access to and uses the means of violence. Two patterns emerged: 
 
(1) Members of the privileged group may use violence to maintain their position (domestic 
violence, sexual harassment, rape, and murder). 
(2) Violence becomes important in gender politics among men. It becomes a way of asserting 
‘masculinity’. 
 
According to Powell (2006), violence is part of the system of domination, while at the same time a 
measure of its imperfection. If the hierarchy were actually legitimate, violence would not be necessary 
to maintain it. Crisis has tendencies; it presupposes a coherent system so that one cannot talk about a 
‘crisis in masculinity’, but we can talk about a crisis of the gender order as a whole. Across 
differences of class, race, sexuality, age and disability, one of the few commonalities that men share, 
as a distinct group, is their gender privilege. Men, like women, are affected by gender power 
structures that are interwoven with other hierarchical structures such as those based on race and class. 
Yet men, regardless of their positioning in other hierarchical structures generally have a strategic, 
common interest in defending and not challenging their gender privilege (Powell, 2006). However, it 
does not appear to be the case that Powell is engaging in reification here in the sense of implying that 
taxonomic collectivities such as ‘men’, ‘white men’ etc are to be regarded as actors in themselves. 
As Connell (2000) points out, a gender order where men dominate women cannot avoid 
constituting men as an interest group concerned with defence, and women as an interest group 
concerned with change. The emphasis on the pressure that masculinity (in a non-reified sense) 
imposes on men to perform and conform to specific masculine roles (emotional and psychological as 
well as political and social) has highlighted the costs to men of current gender arrangements. 
One of the significant achievements of Radical Feminist scholarship has been to name 
the connections between men, gender and power and give them visible expression in the term 
‘patriarchy’ (Connell, 2000). In both the public and domestic spheres, ‘patriarchy’ refers, in 
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theory, to the institutionalisation of male power over women within the economy, the polity, 
household and heterosexual relations. However, it is the contention here that the term 
‘patriarchy’ is an example of what Sibeon (2004) calls the ‘cardinal sin’ of reification; an 
illegitimate form of theoretical reasoning. ‘Patriarchy’, like ‘the state’ (and taxonomic 
collectivities such as ‘white men’, ‘middle class men’ etc.) is not an actor in the sense of 
being able to formulate and act upon decisions. 
Psychiatric social workers test, probe and hypotheses about women, constructing and re-
constructing quantifiable profiles of the bio-psychological and narrowly conceptualised sociological 
factors deemed to be lying at the root of female ‘instability’. Such individualised responses appear to 
generate intervention in female lives, reinforcing the view that it is ‘their’ problem rather than what 
Connell (2000) suggests; the idea that the state’s policies are possibly at fault. 
Ridley (1999:298) makes the point that Western democracies have rejected government 
eugenics programmes, ‘merely to fall into the trap of allowing private eugenics’. He refers to the 
‘pressures’ female patients are subject to with regard to adopting ‘voluntary eugenics’ from 
professionals such as doctors, health insurance companies and from the culture at large. The point is 
made that ‘stories abound’ of women, ‘as late as the 1970s’ being ‘cajoled’ by doctors into 
sterilisation ‘because they carried a gene for a genetic disease’ (Ridley, 1999:298).   In the cases 
Ridley refers to, we might ‘apply’ the idea of Sibeon’s (2004: 136) systemic power, in the sense that 
doctors and other professionals (aside from being individual social actors capable of ‘possessing’ 
power) occupy roles and positions within which, contra Foucault (1991) and Callon and Latour 
(1981), certain elements of power can be ‘stored’ in positions/roles, social institutions and social 
systems. As Sibeon (2004: 136) has suggested, Foucault and Callon and Latour, ‘tend to push their 
relational and processual conceptions of power to the point of denying that power can be ‘stored’ in 
roles and in social systems and networks of social relations’. Here, we might adopt Sibeon’s (2004) 
and Owen’s (2009a) synthesis of a combination of Foucauldian and other relational concepts of 
power, with a systemic understanding of power. As Sibeon (2004: 136) suggests, the synthetic 
conception of power leads to the idea that, ‘agentic power nearly always has a relational, contingent 
and emergent dimension’, which is arguably why the position of what Sibeon calls ‘top dogs’ in any 
institutional sphere is sometimes ‘precariously sustained’. 
We therefore should regard as legitimate the idea that an actor, such as a doctor in the case of 
female patients being ‘cajoled’ into sterilisation referred to by Ridley (1999) has power (which 
invokes the idea of ‘storage’) as long as we do as Sibeon (2004:136) suggests, and recognise, ‘how 
that power is constituted and reproduced relationally’. The latter author makes a reference to the work 
of John Law (1991) here in relation to this point. As Sibeon (2004:136) has made clear, there is good 
evidence to regard power as, ‘partly preconstituted and stored’ (in roles etc.), and ‘partly relational, 
emergent and contingent, with the extent to which power is ‘systemic’ or ‘relational’ being an 
empirical variable ‘ that may vary situationally. This leads to the idea that there are multiple forms of 
power like agentic, systemic and relational ones previously mentioned. In the case of power’s 
multidimensionality, we must consider the possibility that there is a multi-level aspect to this 
phenomenon. In other words, there could be ‘hybrid’ more ‘variegated’ forms of power than 
systemic-relational distinctions might imply. As Sibeon (2004:136) suggests  
 
Agentic power in some circumstances has a largely systemic source deriving, say, from 
position/role. In other circumstances agentic power may be of a relatively contingent, 
emergent kind that emerges during and as an effect of social interaction at the micro or 
mezzo [for example, inter-organisational] levels of social process. Such power may interact 
with systemic or positional/role power of the type that is ‘stored’ in discourses, social 
institutions, and social systems/social networks. There tends, in other words, to be a two-
way [dialectical] relation between systemic and relational forms of power, with each to 
some extent conditioning the other. 
 
Discourse may then, in a sense, be seen to ‘embody’ power, for example, the discourse 
around/about ‘techniques’ of human biotechnology and reproduction such as IVF and pre-natal 
screening (Owen, 2009a). The discourse ‘stores’  power which relates to multiple, countless decisions 
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taken by largely male professionals and administrative actors that, in turn, ‘shape’ the structure within 
which the professionals such as doctors, scientists etc operate and influence agency/decision-making. 
However, we must apply caution here as discourses themselves are not actors. Contra Foucault, 
discourses are (in the sense that they are patterned ways of thinking and behaving), a form of material 
that must be mobilised by actors before the discourse can be regarded as having, ‘any consequence or 
effects’ (Sibeon, 2004:72). 
According to Connell (2000), the concept of ‘hegemony’ is particularly useful in recognising 
the relationship between domination and disempowerment. Alternative definitions of realities and 
ways of behaving are not simply obliterated by power networks. Thus, while physical and 
psychological violence might be a cornerstone of female confinement which supports dominant 
cultural patterns and ideologies, they are utilised within a balance of forces in which there is an 
everyday contestation of power, and where there is always the possibility for individual, social and 
historical change (2000: 184). Connell’s point is arguably an important one. It is also one which is 
often forgotten when Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ is applied theoretically. Domination is 
emphasised at the expense of contradiction, challenge and change both at the level of individual 
identities (women) and social formations (staff/regimes). The process of normalisation and 
routinisation underpins and gives meaning to the self-perception of the individual and the perceptions 
of the significant others in the power networks of the institution. As a comparison to the prison 
system, the work of Sim (1994) makes the point that prisons sustain, reproduce and indeed intensify 
the most negative aspects of masculinity, moulding and remoulding identities and behavioural 
patterns whose destructive manifestations are not left behind the walls when the prisoner (or even 
patient) is released. Disempowerment on the inside, it appears, can be mirrored on the outside. 
A gendered reading of the social order and hierarchies of the female special hospital moves 
therefore beyond bio-psychological models and organisational imperatives or individualised profiles. 
What we need to draw attention to is how the maintenance of order/security both reflects and 
reinforces the pervasive and deeply embedded discourses around particular forms of masculinity. 
However, it must be emphasised that contra Foucault, discourses are not in themselves actors. 
Arguably, as emphasised earlier, they are forms of material that must be mobilised by actors before 
the discourse can be regarded as having any consequence/effects upon society (Sibeon, 2004; Owen, 
2009a). We may view discourses as a potential influence upon social actors, but to regard them as 
agents is to engage in illicit reification. 
In its very ‘celebration of masculinity’ (Connell, 2000), the Special Hospital, like 
other state institutions such as prisons, materially and symbolically reproduces a vision of 
order in which ‘normal womanhood’ remains unproblematic, the template for constructing 
everyday relationships between men and women, prisoners/patients/professionals working 
with them. 
 
Globalizing Masculinities 
 
For some authors, power relations underpin a gendered and inequitable division of labour and access 
to resources. The marketplace, transnational organisations, geopolitical institutions and their attendant 
ideological principles (economic rationality, liberal individualism) express a gendered logic (Powell, 
2006). For Powell (2006), the increasingly unregulated power of transnational corporations places 
strategic power in the hands of particular groups of men, while the language of globalization remains 
‘gender neutral’, so that the ‘individual’ of neo-liberal theory has in general the attributes of a male 
entrepreneur. Gender inequality is ‘responsible’ for, and expressed in, the different articulations of the 
global ‘feminisation of poverty’ (Powell, 2006). Women represent approximately seventy per cent of 
the 1.3 billion poor people in the world. Compared with men, girls and women are most likely to be 
undernourished, and girls and women are most likely to receive less healthcare. Out of approximately 
900 million illiterate adults in the world, 66 per cent are female (Powell, 2006). 
Male violence at physical and symbolic levels appears to be a key determinant of the 
inequities and inequalities of gender relations, both disempowering and impoverishing women. Yet, 
male ‘natural aggression’ is often invoked as a defining characteristic of an  essential gender 
difference and as an explanation for the gendered hierarchical arrangements in the political and 
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economic lives of richer and poorer countries alike (New Statesman, 2000, 14
th
 April, p.22). For 
Powell, an understanding of ‘development as freedom’ and as a ‘right’ means recognising that male 
violence restricts female development by curtailing freedom and restricting rights. The ‘celebration of 
masculinity’ may therefore be possibly interpreted, in Powell’s view, as the exercise of globalised 
power over women to enforce subordination and the maximisation of male power. However, it must 
be emphasised that Powell is not suggesting that the explanation is the only explanation in the sense of 
unitary reductionism. 
There are those too, who are deeply sceptical about the ‘determinist grand narratives of ‘the 
logic of post-industrialism’ and ‘globalisation’ (Owen, 2009b:217). Arguably, we should strive to 
avoid reductionist and essentialist theoretical accounts relying on unitary explanations for complex 
social phenomena  which serve to exaggerate the scale and/or the intensity of ‘globalisation in relation 
to ‘masculinities’, and which underplay the uneven impact of globalising tendencies. It is the view 
here that, ‘the social world is contingent and not determined by macrostructural motor-forces’ (Owen, 
2009b: 217). Any adequate global analysis of the ‘current state of play’ in terms of ‘masculinities’ or 
gender relations must surely also, ‘recognise the role played by agency: patterns of social life and the 
reproduction of social change are in varied ways influenced by human social actors whose ways of 
thinking and formulations of interests/purposes are not structurally predetermined nor guided by 
inexorable ‘post-industrial’ motor forces of change’ (Owen,2009: 217). 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The intention here has been to ‘theorise’ masculinities in relation to violence and crime, to examine 
the evidence for the social construction of ‘masculinities’ and for the gendered nature of global 
inequalities. It is the contention here that those such as Connell (2000), who appear to advocate a 
social constructionist model of ‘masculinities’, drawing upon theoretical constructs such as 
‘hegemonic masculinity’, have some useful and interesting contributions to make to the analysis of 
‘masculinities’, violence and crime. However, purely social constructionist accounts of ‘masculinities’ 
contain theoretical deficits and shortcomings. In particular, it is suggested here that they are less than 
adequate in relation to the conceptualisation and analysis of male sexualities. Arguably, Owen’s 
(2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b; 2009a; 2009b; 2012) post-Postmodern, Genetic-Social approach, which 
focuses upon agency-structure, micro-macro, time-space, modified notions of Foucauldian power ,  
the biological variable (the evidence for a genetic, or partially-genetic basis for some human 
behaviour), psychobiography  (unique, asocial aspects of the person) and arises out of a critique of 
illicit forms of theoretical reasoning such as reductionism, reification, functional teleology, 
essentialism, duality of structure, relativism, the oversocialised gaze (harshly ‘environmentalist’ 
accounts of the person which serve to deny genetic or partially-genetic causality altogether), and 
genetic fatalism (the illicit equation of predisposition with inevitability) is better placed to theorise 
‘masculinities’, violence and crime in the post-Genome era. The intention in this paper is to ‘prepare 
the ground’ for further theoretical and empirical investigation involving large-scale synthesis. There is 
currently considerable interest in the field of ‘masculinities’ and crime, as is evidenced by the work of 
Winlow (2001), Winlow and Hall (2009) Hall (2009), Tomsen (2008), and Owen (2012a; 2011b, 
forthcoming).  It is hoped that the recommendations outlined here may be regarded as a useful 
contribution towards theoretical debates pertaining to gendered power relations and the ‘idea of 
masculinity as a key concept in understanding why most crimes are committed by men’ (Jefferson, 
2007:247). 
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